[Column] China’s diplomatic shift toward S. Korea following its GSOMIA extension

South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Seoul on Dec. 4. (Yonhap News)

Beijing needs to enlist Seoul to its side in dispute with Washington

South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Seoul on Dec. 4. (Yonhap News)

Quite a few American diplomats descended upon Seoul before the scheduled termination of South Korea’s information-sharing agreement with Japan last month. Those diplomats were quite open in their attack on China. If the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) was terminated, they said, the only countries that would be pleased are China, North Korea, and Russia. They also accused China of assuming that “might makes right.”

As soon as South Korea bowed to American pressure and agreed to extend GSOMIA on a conditional basis, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited South Korea. During a courtesy call to South Korean President Moon Jae-in, a meeting with South Korea’s foreign minister, and a conference with figures friendly to China, Wang repeatedly lashed out at the US’ “unilateralism” and “hegemony.” He also blamed the US for the Terminal High-Altitude Defense (THAAD) issue, which he said the US had instigated with China as its target. Wang’s behavior on this trip differed considerably from the head-on assault he launched against then Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2016, shortly after Seoul approved the THAAD deployment. During that forum, Wang said that “South Korea had damaged the foundation of trust between the two countries.”

Wang Yi reserves sharpest criticism for US, sends amiable signals to S. Korea

Throughout his trip to South Korea, Wang reserved his sharpest attacks for the US and sent more amiable signals to Seoul, which he described as a “trustworthy long-term cooperative partner” and part of a “community of interest, with US$300 billion in bilateral trade.” He also emphasized how much he likes Korean-style jajangmyeon (a black-sauce noodle dish inspired by Chinese cuisine) and mentioned the links between South Korea’s March 1 Movement and China’s May 4 Movement. Wang had refrained from visiting South Korea for five years after the THAAD incident; on his return visit, he deftly employed diplomacy in an attempt to draw South Korea closer to China or at least convince Seoul to maintain its neutrality amid the increasingly heated hegemony rivalry between Beijing and Washington.

While reporting on the visits by American and Chinese diplomats to South Korea last month, I got a clear sense of how South Korea has become a battlefield in the two countries’ hegemonic rivalry. The two powers are both asking South Korea ― which leans on the US for security and on China in economic matters ― to take their side. South Korea is facing a multifaceted threat: its security may be endangered if it ignores the American demands and its economy may be jeopardized if it doesn’t listen to China.

After caving to American pressure by conditionally extending GSOMIA, South Korea now faces a demand for a massive increase in its contribution to the cost of stationing American troops in its territory, as well as the threat of a potential withdrawal of the American garrison. Given these circumstances, China appears to be concerned that South Korea will make an even bigger concession to the US vis-