[Column] South Korea’s “support of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”

South Korean President Moon Jae-in (center) poses for a photo with ASEAN heads of state who attended the South Korean-ASEAN special summit in Busan on Nov. 26.

Statement highlights “ASEAN centrality” in US-China battle for regional hegemony

South Korean President Moon Jae-in (center) poses for a photo with ASEAN heads of state who attended the South Korean-ASEAN special summit in Busan on Nov. 26.

The Republic of Korea-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in Busan wrapped up its two-day schedule on Nov. 26. While it did not draw much attention, it was quite a significant event that brought the leaders of nine ASEAN countries (not including Cambodia) together in South Korea to share ideas.

A 43-item South Korean-ASEAN co-chairs’ statement included everything from an overall outline to economic, social, cultural, and regional issues. With its specificity in terms of the scale and format of cooperation, it is worthy of recognition as a new milestone in South Korea-ASEAN cooperation.

Particularly notable is item 6 of the statement, which referred to South Korea’s “support of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.” President Moon Jae-in also said that South Korea “welcomes the ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’ announced by the ASEAN countries this past June, and we will join in regional cooperation based on ASEAN Centrality.” Taken together, the joint statement and Moon’s remarks seem to indicate that Seoul is openly espousing the “ASEAN Outlook” as its response to the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy.

In a chairman’s statement at their 34th summit in Bangkok on June 23, ASEAN announced its adoption of an “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.” That statement named the ASEAN Outlook as a chief principle alongside five other principles: ASEAN centrality, inclusiveness, complementarities, a rules-based order anchored upon international law, and commitment to advancing economic engagement in the region.

Not leaning too far toward either the US or China

“ASEAN centrality” could be read as signifying an intent to preserve ASEAN’s identity without leaning too far in the direction of either of the two surrounding major powers. “Inclusiveness” means that the countries do not intend to exclude or antagonize China. At the same time, the reference to a “rules-based order” suggests that they hope to curb China’s attempts to expand its influence in the South China Sea and elsewhere. In short, they seem to be rejecting the US and China’s demands to take sides and their attempts to broaden their presence, while emphasizing economic cooperation over military or security-related matters.

Despite their shared geopolitical characteristics, the 10 ASEAN countries are quite different in terms of politics, culture, and religion. Some, like Cambodia, are friendly with China; others, like Vietnam, lean more toward the US side. This is why the “ASEAN Outlook” is so meaningful: in spite of these differences, it draws out the common denominators to allow its member nations to respond to a fast-changing international environment.

Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy not much different from Asia policies of past US admins.

In truth, the Indo-Pacific strategy of the Donald Trump administration in the US is not all that different from the Asia policies of his predecessors. Speaking at the APEC Summit in Vietnam in November 2017, Trump explained his Indo-Pacific strategy simply in terms of “free and fair trade.” In the two years since then, it has “evolved” under the guidance of the Pentagon, State Department, and experts into a strategy package for containing China -- all in “military” and “security-related” guise -- and any sort of distinction from past administrations’ policies has become greatly attenuated.

Some might note the emphasis on India’s strategic role, but the George W. Bush administration signed a “special” atomic energy agreement with India and provided it with nuclear power plant technology and nuclear material in spite of its history of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) violations. The US’ admission to the East Asia Summit under the Barack Obama administration also happened because India was a member. Moreover, the powerful lingering legacies of non-aligned thinking, great-power favoritism, and Hindu nationalism prevent any cooperation system from being immediately achieved. The aggressive courting of the US and China is really only a long-term strategy; as a short-term approach, its limitations are clear.

Over the course of the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, the US’ Asia strategy has come to focus on East Asia as a “weak link” in the US-China power battle. In particular, South Korea and Japan -- both of which have a large US military presence and have to pay defense costs -- make for easy targets for the US to produce short-term, visible outcomes. The “conditional extension” of the South Korea-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) once again showed that neither Seoul nor Tokyo has much space for diplomatic independence from Washington.

As things stand, strategic and economic cooperation with ASEAN is not a choice but a necessity. Laying the groundwork for cooperation through efforts to truly understand and embrace cultural and historical differences is a task facing all of us. Item 39 of the co-chairs’ statement declares: “We [ASEAN heads of state] looked forward to working closely to share national policies and promote cooperation between ASEAN and ROK to ensure that marriage immigrants, multicultural families and others can integrate into their country of residence.”

By Lee Yong-in, head of international news

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